ABSTRACT. Crowding-out during the British Industrial Revolution has long been one of the leading explanations for slow growth during the Industrial Revolution, but little empirical evidence exists to support it. We argue that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided, and that the eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century private loan market balanced through quantity rationing. Using a unique set of observations on lending volume at a London goldsmith bank, Hoare's, we document the impact of wartime financing on private credit markets. We conclude that there is considerable evidence that government borrowing, especially during wartime, crowded out private credit.
Introduction
How did government policy influence England's financial and economic development during the Industrial Revolution? Depending on the time period in question, the existing literature suggests diametrically opposed answers. For the years before 1750, North and Weingast famously argued that government finance was central to the origins and course of the First Industrial Revolution. The improved institutions and public debt management following the Glorious Revolution allegedly lowered risk premia and improved property rights.
1 Subsequently, however, England's frequent wars during the eighteenth century -fought with the fiscal machine installed by William of Orange and his Dutch advisors -increased public debt. Williamson argued that wartime finance "crowded-out" private investment, slowing output growth. For all their intuitive appeal, evidence supporting both hypotheses has been scant. Many authors have examined changes in interest rates and the yield on private assets.
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Analysis of prices is an attractive research strategy for economic historians -they can be as useful as quantities, and are often easier to collect. 4 We argue however that interest rates are not the right indicator of scarcity in the case of eighteenth-century finance -for both practical and conceptual reasons. In contrast to goods markets, where price is an efficient way of allocating scarce goods, credit markets rarely reach equilibrium through changes in interest rates alone. Since usury laws historically set a maximum interest rate below the market-clearing rate for private loans, rationing was the only way to restore equilibrium. Also, even in the absence of legal constraints, lenders had strong incentives to ration credit at lower rates. Hence, government interest rates showed "excess stability". As Ashton put it: "the existence of this upper limit [on interest rates] is of the utmost importance to an understanding of the fluctuations of the period. Once the critical point had been reached further borrowing might become impossible."
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The North-Weingast interpretation of England's rise is elegant, and it ties in with a growing literature on the institutional and financial determinants of development.
Theoretical arguments strongly suggest that the Glorious Revolution ought to have played a role in the economy's initial transformation -historically, greater constraints on the executive often are correlated with higher growth. 6 The same is true of financial development, as measured by the volume of intermediated finance, which appears to be robustly associated with higher per capita incomes in post-war samples, as well as during some historical periods. 7 According to North and Weingast, the institutional changes following the Glorious Revolution made lending to the government a far safer proposition. Parliament's increasing influence and growing constraints on the executive translated into lower risk premia. This allowed for cheaper borrowing by the private 3 Mirowski 1981; Clark 2001; Quinn 2001; Sussman and Yafeh 2002 . 4 Antràs and Voth 2003. 5 Ashton 1959. 6 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002; DeLong and Shleifer, 1993. 7 Levine and Zervos 1998; Rajan and Zingales 1998; Rousseau and Sylla 2001. 
Credit rationing and the stability of interest rates
In this paper, we propose a simple way of solving the puzzle -credit rationing. If rationing was common, we should find that lending took place at a standardized rate, and that it did not respond to changes in economic conditions. Instead, the market should have balanced through quantity rationing. Credit rationing -the refusal of lenders to provide loans independent of the interest rate offered -is common in financial markets today. As Stiglitz and Weiss argued, it probably accounts for a fair share of modern-day macroeconomic fluctuations. 20 Asymmetric information is crucial -because borrowers willing to pay very high interest rates are inherently bad risks, banks need other ways of allocating credit than through changes in the interest rate 16 This does not necessarily imply that borrowing costs were low -since contemporaries rightly expected deflation, high nominal interest rates probably translated into high ex ante real rates (Williamson 1987 Weiss 1999, Jaffee and Stiglitz 1990. charged. The more scarce reliable information about borrowers is, the harder it will be to differentiate rates at all.
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There is abundant indirect evidence that credit rationing was a key feature of eighteenth-century credit markets. In a famous passage from the Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith observed that:
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If the legal rate of interest in Great Britain, for example, was fixed so high as eight or ten per cent, the greater part of the money which was to be lent would be lent to prodigals and projectors, who alone would be willing to give this high interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a part of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture into the competition. A great part of the capital of the country would thus be kept out of the hands which were most likely to make a profitable and advantageous use of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to waste and destroy it.
Smith therefore suggested that usury limits were economically efficient. In eighteenthcentury Britain, adverse selection problems would have been substantial if interest rates had been allowed to rise to market-clearing levels. Private lenders should have found it advantageous to curtail lending and discriminate against borrowers who would have been willing to pay the market-clearing rate.
Ashton also questioned the usefulness of interest rates as an indicator of scarcity, and described the situation of the credit-market during wartime:
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It was not, then, simply through a rise in the cost of borrowing, but through interruptions to the flow of funds, that depression came to [the building and construction trade]. … When the rate of 5 per cent had been reached builders and contractors might be getting all the loans they wanted, or, on the other hand, many of them might be in acute need of more. If we want to know the degree of scarcity we must look for other sources of information.
21 Jaffee and Stiglitz 1990 . 22 Smith 1982 22 Smith [1776 , b. 2, c. 4. 23 Ashton 1959. In the case highlighted by Ashton, a methodology that focuses exclusively on interest rates cannot shed much light on the crowding-out hypothesis and on the effects of institutional reform after 1688.
Figure 1 presents a simple model of quantity rationing. 24 Lending volume Q 0 will be determined by the profit-maximizing interest rate r 0 . The shadow cost of capital will be τ 0 , substantially above r 0 . With a demand shock that moves the demand curve outwards -such as public borrowing in wartime -lending volume may rise. 25 If quantity is not rationed at Q 1 , with the overall interest rate rising to r 1 , the shadow cost of capital will be markedly higher -τ 1 . This is the maximum interest rate that borrowers would have been willing to pay if all their surplus was appropriated by the lender. Note that the smaller the increase in quantity and the smaller the increase of interest rates at which lending occurs, the larger the rise in the shadow rate will be. If interest rates were close to the legal maximum or at the profit-maximizing rate before a demand shock, the loan market may continue to supply Q 0 at r 0 . The shadow rate would then have risen to τ 2 .
In a credit market characterized by the situation in Figure 1 , examining interest-rate changes such as the one from r 0 to r 1 is not very informative. In order to make sense of the role of government and government finance in England's economic development, we must take the possibility of quantity rationing seriously. What is therefore needed is information on the total volume of loans made.
Aggregate information on lending volume is unavailable. Instead, we use the records of a West-End bank, Hoare's, to examine the issue of credit rationing. Hoare's Bank was (and is) a private bank in the West End of London. Initially founded by Richard Hoare, a goldsmith, it energetically moved into banking from the 1690s onwards. From 1702, Hoare's focused on lending and securities trading, shedding the remnants of its goldsmithing business. 26 The bank soon acquired a select clientele that took out a variety of loans, from mortgages to securities lending and pawn against jewellery. By 24 Based on Jaffee and Stiglitz 1990. We follow their lead in assuming that each bank earns quasi-rents from its knowledge of its customers and the volume of loans is less than in the competitive equilibrium. 25 This will depend on the extent to which borrowers are indifferent between the types of securities offered.
the 1730s, it was lending more than £150,000 per year, and taking deposits of up to £450,000. Since 1702, Hoare's drew up annual balance sheets. Normally compiled in September, they summarize the bank's debts to depositors and the partners, its claims on borrowers, and holdings of silver and precious stones, of cash and securities. We collected the balance sheets from 1702 to 1862, except for a few missing years near the beginning of our period. The reporting format varied, but it almost always contained information on total lending volume, total deposits, and cash reserves.
The bank was, of course, only one of several such institutions involved in credit intermediation. In addition to other banks, scriveners offered intermediation services similar to those provided by French notaries, and much lending took the form of trade credit and personal lending. 27 Joslin estimates that there were 13 "West End" bankers in 1725, and 15 in 1785, and that the total number of banks in London rose from 24 to 52 over the period. These are conservative, lower bound estimates. As early as 1700, some scholars calculate the total number of London banks to be as high as 42. 28 We cannot say how representative Hoare's bank was; yet we do know that no other bank achieved such longevity.
Was Hoare's rationing credit? Our first piece of evidence comes simply from the distribution of interest rates. Figure 2 shows the distribution of lending rates with the individual loans as the unit of observation. In the early eighteenth century, Hoare's made 92 percent of all loans against interest at the usury limit -6 percent up to 1714, and 5 percent thereafter.
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Qualitative evidence reinforces the view that quantity rationing was frequent. Hoare's bank told one of its clients who sought to take out a loan that, independent of the conditions offered, it could not extend credit: In a situation like the one described in Hoare's letter to its customer, there is little reason to believe that the private interest rates yield much information on the availability and cost of credit. We find that Hoare's acted in way that is compatible with the argument set out in its letter -during wartime, it kept 29.5 percent of its assets in cash, compared to 25.1 percent during peacetime. Two channels may have been crucial for transmitting government borrowing shocks to the financial system. In both cases, we should observe less lending by a private bank like Hoare's whenever the government's borrowing requirements increased markedly. The balance sheets, combined with information on the public debt of the United Kingdom, allow us to test this hypothesis in more detail.
In our attempt to trace credit rationing, as exemplified by the case of Hoare's, we argue for the following simple causal chain: Higher wartime borrowing will simultaneously increase the availability of liquid government debt and raise the price of borrowing. As borrowers use their accumulated deposits to purchase government debt, banks will lend less. Since almost all lending is at the maximum rate allowed by the usury laws, this will not become apparent in higher rates on private loan transactions. Instead, lending volume contracted, as less desirable (or less well-connected) borrowers lose access to credit. In addition, the bank may have decided to hold government debt instead of lending to private individuals or firms.
Government borrowing and private lending: Evidence from Hoare's
To separate trend from cycle for all our variables, we regress the log of each variable Z on a constant, a time trend, and the trend squared (to capture non-linearities):
In our analysis, we will mainly use the residuals ε of Hoare's lending volume (HGAP), of government debt (DebtGAP), and of industrial output (QGAP). We use these variables in the quantitative analysis below. Because of missing observations on the size of Hoare's balance sheet and because of our focus on the period of the industrial revolution, we use data from 1720 onwards.
The top panel of Figure 3 gives an impression of the growth of Hoare's business. The bottom panel shows the type of shocks (HGAP) that need to be explained. Hoare's lending against interest grew from £50,000 in 1702 to over £2,000,000 in 1860. The rise parallels the increase in total output in the British economy over the period, and suggests higher demand for intermediation services. This long, continuous upward trend in total lending was sometimes checked or even reversed by conditions in any one year, by the vagaries of a family business where a partner's death can lead to changes in the bank's equity, and the political situation.
To examine the impact of wartime financing, in Figure 4 we plot the lending residual HGAP alongside the growth of public debt (DebtGAP). While lending fluctuates with greater frequency, the overall impression is one of a strong, inverse correlation between lending and debt growth. At the very beginning of the period, during the War of the Spanish Succession, lending growth relative to trend was lacklustre. There is ample evidence that massive government borrowing was an important contributing factor, even if some of the slowdown must be attributed to factors specific to Hoare's bank shocks during peacetime were largely positive. In Figure 5 , we plot the smoothed distributions of lending volume (HGAP) to show the gap between actual lending and trend lending at Hoare's, conditional on the whether or not the country is at war. 33 The median change in lending in a war year was -8.1 percent; in peacetime, it was 5.6 percent.
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In order to describe the evolution of lending, we briefly examine correlations between our main variables (Table 1) . Public sector interest rates were correlated both with the growth rate of lending at Hoare's and the bank's cash ratio. Not surprisingly, high interest rates are correlated with high debt volumes and wars. More importantly for this paper, high interest rates are associated with slowdowns in the growth of national income. Hoare's lending also is correlated with the other variables in ways that suggest we can use this single bank as a proxy for more general credit conditions. To be sure, it is heroic to assume that Hoare's is broadly representative of all banks. But since there are no other data on private lending volumes, we make this assumption out of necessity, 32 A χ2-test suggests that the difference is significant at the 1 percent level. 33 We use a non-parametric technique (Epanechnikov kernel density estimation) for smoothing.
not by choice. Interestingly, to the extent that this procedure is flawed and aggregate lending failed to move in line with Hoare's, our results represent a lower bound on the true effects of a government-induced "credit crunch" -we are effectively adding noise to our measure of lending volume, by using Hoare's data as an imperfect proxy of aggregate changes.
The strong decline of lending growth during years of massive government borrowing
should not come as a surprise. Since the median length of a loan at Hoare's was 281 days, the bank could influence its total lending relatively quickly -calling in loans, as described in its letter to its prospective client. For the first forty years, we can easily separate deposits from partners' equity. Customers' funds fell significantly when government borrowing increased, which offers a ready explanation for the negative correlation of lending with government borrowing. We only have data on the firm's equity for 1702-24, and the results consequently have to be treated with care. There is no significant positive correlation with interest rates or Hoare's lending gap, and only an insignificantly negative one with the cash/asset ratio. Higher debt public debt seems to have led to a lowering of partner's equity, but this correlation, while statistically significant, depends crucially on a handful of observations. Equity rose and fell with the death of partners and the entry of new ones, but competition by the public purse for funds may have been an additional factor.
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For more systematic tests, we will use the lending gap depicted in Figure 3 as the dependent variable in our regressions, taking the overall upward trend of lending over the century-and-a-half between 1702 and 1862 as given. This has the added benefit that our dependent variable is stationary. In Table II , we use a variety of specifications to demonstrate the robustness of the link between government borrowing and private lending. We estimate
34 The visual impression from Figure 5 is confirmed by a median regression. We find a coefficient of -0.14, with a t-statistic of 3.85. For methodological background, see Koenker and Hallock 2001. 35 The data is described in greater detail in Temin and Voth 2003a. where HGAP is the residual from Figure 3 , C1 is the intercept, X is one of the exogenous variables, and e is the error term. speaking unchanged between the longer interest series and the one for consols, which suggests a slightly greater impact. During wartime, lending is about 9 percent lower than normal. This tallies well with the fact that consol rates during wartime are one percentage point higher on average than during peacetime. Debt increases above trend depress lending strongly and significantly.
The OLS estimates appear to suffer from serial correlation -Lagrange multiplier tests strongly reject the null of no autocorrelation in the error term. Hence, we also use the Marquardt NLS estimator. It yields similar coefficients on the interest rate variables, and confirms their statistical significance. The coefficient on war now drops substantially and is no longer significant, but this may be an artefact of the estimation method and the correction procedure for serial correlation.
In estimating eq. (1), we assumed that the interest rate on government borrowing was unaffected by lending at Hoare's and its peers -the error term e, we implicitly argued, is uncorrelated with any of the explanatory variables. This is probably correct for the war dummy, but the borrowing rate for the government could very well be correlated with the error term. If a savings "shortage" because of, say, competing Dutch borrowing or the South bubble pushed up the public interest rate, this may also have made it harder for Hoare's to obtain deposits and lend. We would be falsely attributing this change to 36 We use data from Sussman and Yafeh 2002. We thank Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh for kindly making their data available. Their data on consols includes annuity rates for the period 1730-53.
the influence of government borrowing if government spending at increased at the same time. The bias could also point in the opposite direction, with economic growth raising the marginal product of capital, stimulating loan demand and reducing government borrowing due to higher tax revenues. If interest rate shocks for government debt were partly driven by higher borrowing demand from the private sector, then we will have estimated a lower bound on the true effect of government borrowing.
To sidestep these issues, we do two things. First, we try to control for macroeconomic conditions, by including the index of industrial output growth in our regressions.
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Second, we use an instrumental variables approach, and jointly estimate:
where i is the government borrowing rate, QGap is the deviation of log output from trend, W is a war dummy, and e and u are error terms (Table III) . The second equation identifies the component of i that is driven by government wartime borrowing. This is then used to explain lending shocks at Hoare's bank, using two stage least squares (TSLS) for estimation. In addition to simply using the war dummy, we also use government borrowing as an instrument for the interest rate. The underlying assumption is that lending at Hoare's was not influenced by public borrowing or war in any way other than through the effect on interest rates for government debt. We will relax this assumption later.
We find somewhat larger coefficients on public sector interest rates than under OLS, with lending declining by 11 to 26 percent for every additional 100 basis points of debt service. This suggests that some of the positive shocks to interest rates that were not driven by war were less inimical to bank lending and intermediation -it could be the case that some of these interest rate increases reflected growing demand for privatesector credit. The effect is stronger and more significant when we use the consol rate as an explanatory variable. This is most likely driven by the nature of our data -the earlier interest rate series based on average interest payments relative to debt payment, while broadly similar, is not exactly comparable. For the period that matters for our argument, the years after 1750, the consol series suggests very strong negative effects of government borrowing on private lending. Including changes in industrial output appears to make little difference to our estimates. Given that the average difference in public sector interest rates between war-and peacetime was 62 basis points, this
suggests an average drop of actual lending below its trend value by 7 to 16 percent.
Williamson assumed that there was 1:1 "crowding out" between private lending and government borrowing. Our estimates in Table II 
In this way, using non-structural estimation, we impose few constraints, and allow for feedback effects from, say, higher lending at Hoare's (as a result of buoyant loan demand during good time) to lower government borrowing. We estimate with 3 lags.
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The impulse response function for lending and government borrowing is plotted in Figure 6 . A one standard deviation increase of the government's debt stock (equivalent to 8 percent) reduced lending by 3 percent in the first year, by 5 percent in the second year, and by 5.5 percent in the third year. The effect remains statistically significant for the first four years. This suggests that Britain's wars represented a major shock to the nascent system of credit intermediation, and that its effects were strongly negative. The true impact over several years may therefore well be closer to unity. 38 We orthogonalize the responses by using the Cholesky decomposition, and the ordering (DebtGAP, HGAP).
Credit rationing and economic growth
Using firm-level data on lending volumes, we find clear evidence of credit rationing as a result of wartime borrowing. This is a necessary step towards showing that "crowding out" was important, but it is not sufficient. Did it matter for Britain's economic performance? We emphasize two facts.
First, higher debt growth coincided with slower output growth. Second, the decline in lending volumes during wartime was probably large enough to account for the marked slowdown, as argued in section 3. Conclusive proof of a connection is almost impossible, but we can examine some of the circumstantial evidence. We of course do not have data on aggregate private lending. Instead we use the detrended lending volume at Hoare's as a proxy for the aggregate. In years when lending at Hoare's was above trend, the difference between industrial output growth in wartime and in peacetime is small and not significant -a mere 1.2 percent (Table IV) .
When lending was below trend, however, growth overall was slower, and the difference between years with and without armed conflict was pronounced -10.3 percent. We therefore have some evidence that Britain's wars were indeed bad for the growth of industrial output, and that the transmission of the shock depended partly on the process of credit intermediation. When lending collapsed, growth was slow in general, and wartime led to a fall in production; when it held up more or less well, growth was more 39 Crafts and Harley 1992. rapid and even years of military conflict did little to dent the rise of the First Industrial Nation.
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A closer look at the distributions suggests that it is mainly "growth disasters" that are responsible for the results in Figure 6 . During wartime, 85 percent of the output deviations are negative if lending was below trend. If it was above trend, fewer than half of the years in our sample recorded negative deviations of output growth.
One simple test of the proposed link explaining the slowdown runs from greater borrowing to higher interest rates and hence, slower industrial output growth. Table V investigates the basic patterns. A rise in interest rates almost always coincided with a slowdown in growth. The result holds independent of the estimation technique used and the specification of the interest rate variable. We also find a direct effect of war; since conflict (and its effects) typically lasted for more than one year, the serial-correlation correction has difficulty estimating the effect precisely. Crucially, we find that higher government borrowing slowed industrial growth. We use the deviations from log trend, as in the earlier analysis, as well as growth rates of government debt. The latter exhibits the same short-run volatility as the output series, and consequently contains more information that we can exploit to pin down the relationship. We find that, on average, a one percent rise in interest rates slowed growth by 4 to 7 percent, and that for every ten percent increase in government debt, industrial output fell by 2 to 4 percent below trend.
The evidence presented in Figure 6 and in Tables IV and V is suggestive. "Crowdingout" as an explanation of slow growth during Britain's Industrial Revolution will be strengthened if we can show that lower lending volume was sufficient to produce a marked slowdown in growth, and if output growth responded quickly to changes in lending. If lending at Hoare's was broadly representative of that at other banks, then the rationing effects found earlier can be used to infer the overall impact of more government spending. 40 Note that this is not driven by many many of the observations for positive lending gaps coming from the period after the end of the Napoleonic wars -we have 21 wartime observations from the 18 th century in the sample with HGAP >= 0.
The same VAR method used earlier can be employed to investigate the effects of government borrowing on national output (industrial production) more directly, again using three lags. 
In this way, we allow for feedback effects from output to borrowing as well as from borrowing to industrial output. Figure 8 shows the impulse response of output to greater government borrowing. The effect is positive at the 95 percent level from year 2 and remains substantial and significant until year 5. A one standard deviation increase of government debt will reduce output by a cumulative 5.2 percent over 10 years, according to the VAR estimate.
We confirmed this result with a three-factor VAR (not reported), adding HGAP to the list of variables. As noted at the outset of this argument, Hoare's lending is a noisy proxy for total lending, and it might not show up in a VAR. The larger VAR confirms the result shown in Figure 8 that industrial output responded negatively to government debt, although the standard errors are larger. Hoare's lending did as well, as we have shown. Finally, Hoare's lending in the VAR keeps government lending constant. This estimate is the converse of our IV estimates in Table III , where we used only the part of Hoare's lending that was affected by government actions. The rest of Hoare's lending did not have any effect on industrial production; Hoare's was only a conduit for government policy, not an independent force affecting national income.
All the individual elements that are necessary to make the "crowding-out" story plausible are therefore in place -heavy government borrowing reduced private lending sharply, and industrial growth slowed markedly whenever public debt grew rapidly.
This was especially true in years when the rise in public borrowing coincided with a private-sector credit crunch. We find that independent of the analytical technique usedfrom simply eyeballing the data to VAR analysis -quantity-based measures strongly suggest that "crowding out" in eighteenth-century Britain was substantial.
Conclusions
What is the connection between the financial revolution and the industrial revolution?
We argue that earlier attempts to answer this question fell short because they focused on direct measures of the cost of credit intermediation. This procedure is flawed because interest rates were heavily regulated in eighteenth-century England, and there is ample reason to think that yields on government debt do not provide a meaningful guide to scarcity. Knowledgeable observers from Adam Smith to T.S. Ashton emphasized the importance of the usury laws in keeping interest rates low, independent of credit conditions, and the normal asymmetric information problems that dominate in many lending relationships.
We use micro-level evidence to argue that quantity rationing was indeed a key feature of the England's credit market during the Industrial Revolution. Annual balance sheets from Hoare's Bank allow us to trace changes in the volume of lending over 163 years, from 1702 to 1865. A number of findings stand out. Wartime borrowing did crowd out private lending on a massive scale. When war was imminent, Hoare's -anticipating that it would have to pay out deposits so that its customers could move funds into government securities -immediately started to boost its cash ratio. It did so by reducing credit to its customers, calling in old loans and refusing to make new ones. On balance, our results suggest substantial crowding, but perhaps on a scale of somewhat less than 1:1, where a one percent rise in government debt led to a one percent decline in Hoare's lending, relative to their long-term trends. Instrumental-variable estimation suggests that wartime borrowing led to even more severe crowding-out than normal government borrowing.
There is also ample evidence to suggest that the decline in lending volume slowed industrial growth, and hence hindered Britain's industrial transformation. Using the changes in lending volume at Hoare's as a proxy for total lending volume, we find that wartime contractions of output were particularly severe when accompanied by a private-sector "credit crunch". When the demands of Army and Royal Navy did not lead to tight credit conditions at home, however, growth was largely undisturbed. Our findings appear to suggest a comprehensive vindication of the crowding-out hypothesis.
Once the right variables are analyzed, the impact of government borrowing is clear and strongly negative.
At the same time, our view into the lending process at an eighteenth-century goldsmith also cautions against such a one-sided conclusion. In examining the impact of wartime borrowing on private-sector lending volumes, we take the existence of a sophisticated system of deposit-taking banks for granted. Yet Hoare's depositors left their money in their bank accounts in the expectation that, every few years, they could move their funds into safe government securities. It was war that provided this opportunity. Sussman and Yafeh (2002) , spliced to the consol rate (after 1731), HGAP is deviation of log lending volume at Hoare's from a quadratic trend, as depicted in Figure 3 . Debtgap is the deviation of log government debt from a quadratic trend, based on the data from Mitchell (1971) , p. 600, QGap is deviation of log industrial output from a quadratic trend, with the annual series taken from Crafts and Harley (1992) , War is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during wartime, and 0 otherwise. Equity is partner's equity in the firm. Sample period is 1720-1862, except for eq. 3 and 7, where data availability requires us to start in 1730.
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